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 Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to 
the United States Constitution  
 
 Mehrdad Payandeh?
 
  
 ABSTRACT  
 
Ever since the First Federal Congress in 1789 adopted the Bill of 
Rights, amendments to the United States Constitution have not been 
interwoven with the original text but appended to it. An examination 
of the historical background reveals that this decision of Congress was 
based on a misconception of the nature of a constitution and of 
constitutional rights in particular. It was furthermore motivated by the 
opponents of the Bill of Rights who tried to diminish the meaning and 
significance of the amendments. This somewhat arbitrary and 
misinformed decision about constitutional design had a subtle but 
significant influence on further constitutional developments: on the 
practice of making amendments, on the symbolic nature of the 
Constitution and the character of the Bill of Rights, and on 
constitutional interpretation. 
 
“Form, sir, is always of less importance than the substance; 
but on this occasion, I admit that form is of some consequence.” 
 
James Madison1
 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Constitutional amendments play a significant role in the narrative 
of the history, law, and politics of the United States Constitution. The 
Founding was characterized by the repudiation of the amendment 
procedure under the Articles of Confederation in favor of the 
 
? Dr. iur., LL.M. (Yale), Senior Research Fellow, Heinrich-Heine-University of Duesseldorf. I 
am grateful to Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Bruce Ackerman for their thoughtful comments 
and valuable suggestions. 
 1. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 708 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 118 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. 
Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
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revolutionary approach of 1787.2 Immediately after the Founding, the 
formulation of the Bill of Rights as amendments to the Constitution 
preoccupied the First Federal Congress. The Civil War resulted in the 
Reconstruction Amendments, arguably the most important 
transformation of U.S. constitutional law in the nineteenth century. 
This importance of amendments for constitutional reality justifies the 
enormous attention constitutional scholars pay to issues surrounding 
the amendment procedure: did the Fourteenth Amendment enter into 
force in a constitutional way, even though the Republican government 
excluded the all-white southern governments from the process?3 Is the 
procedure of constitutional amendment under Article V of the U.S. 
Constitution exclusive?4 Or is it just one form of higher lawmaking 
alongside a more informal process of constitutional moments?5
Yet, one particular aspect of the amendment mechanism has 
hardly attracted any attention among constitutional scholars: the fact 
that amendments do not alter the original Constitution but are added to 
the text in a supplementary form. Students of the U.S. Constitution 
may be inclined to take this form of constitutional amending for 
granted. All twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution have been 
added to the original Constitution in this manner. The text of the 
original Constitution has never been changed. It is the same text that 
was adopted at the Philadelphia Convention on September 17, 1787, 
and subsequently ratified by the state conventions; however, a casual 
gaze at the practice of constitutional design around the world and 
within the U.S. reveals that the Constitution’s mode of amendment is 
rather exotic. Modern constitutions are regularly amended by changing 
the text. New provisions are not adhered in chronological order but 
interwoven with the text. A look at the constitutional history of the 
 
Scholars have comprehensively scrutinized the amendment procedure 
as well as the content and scope of the single amendments. 
 
 2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 29–33, 285–86 
(2005); Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
475, 480 (1995). 
 3. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–252 (1998) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not come about in the process constitutionally 
envisioned by Article V); AMAR, supra note 2, at 379 (arguing that the exclusion was justified 
under the guarantee of a republican form of government according to Article IV, § 4 of the U.S. 
Constitution); see also the counterplea by Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1737, 1747 n.25 (2007). 
 4. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on 
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (arguing for 
the exclusivity of the Article V amendment procedure); see also Thomas E. Baker, Towards a 
“More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts on Amending the Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
1, 3 (2000); AMAR, supra note 2, at 295–99 (accepting the theoretical possibility of constitutional 
amendments outside of Article V). 
 5. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991). 
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United States confirms that the federal model did not come as a 
necessary consequence. In fact, when James Madison proposed the 
Bill of Rights to the First Federal Congress in June of 1789, he 
propounded that the amendments be integrated into the original text of 
the Constitution.6
The historical background of the First Federal Congress’s decision 
in favor of adding amendments in a supplementary form, and against 
incorporating or interweaving them with the original text, is 
documented only fragmentarily and only with regard to the 
deliberations in the House of Representatives.
 
7 Scholars have analyzed 
this history and offered some tentative conclusions about the prevailing 
conception of constitutionalism at the time of the First Congress.8 In 
addition, they have offered a draft of how the U.S. Constitution could 
look today, had Madison prevailed.9
Yet, an analysis of how the peculiar design of the amendment 
technique has influenced subsequent constitutional developments and 
our perception of the Constitution and of constitutional law in general 
is missing until today. This article will attempt to fill in this gap in 
constitutional scholarship and to examine in more detail the impact of 
the First Congress’s decision in favor of the supplementary form of 
amendments. Part II of this article is devoted to the historical question 
of why Congress chose to append amendments to the Constitution and 
not to interweave them with the text. Part III examines the influence 
this decision had on the development of the Constitution. 
 
 
 II.  THE 1789 DECISION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS  
 
An inquiry into the significance of the supplementary style of 
constitutional amendments has to begin with the debate between James 
Madison and Connecticut Congressman Roger Sherman who, during 
the First Congress in 1789, objected to Madison’s approach and 
introduced the idea of adding amendments as an annex to the text of 
the original Constitution.10
 
 6. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
 The refusal of the Philadelphia Convention 
1, at 11–14. 
 7. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 55–213; see also GEORGE 
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 33 (1995). 
 8. See Price Marshall, Essay, “A Careless Written Letter” – Situating Amendments to 
the Federal Constitution, 51 ARK. L. REV. 95, 96–112 (1998); Edward Hartnett, A “Uniform 
and Entire” Constitution; Or, What if Madison had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252–58 
(1998); Carlos E. González, Representational Structures Through Which We the People Ratify 
Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of the Constitution’s Ratification Clauses, 
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1489–96 (2005); Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1747, 1778–93 (2005). 
 9. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 284–99. 
 10. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
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to include a bill of rights in the Constitution served as one of the 
major obstacles in the ratification of the new Constitution and fueled 
the Anti-Federalist opposition to the Constitution.11
On what basis, then, did the First Congress decide in favor of the 
supplementary method of constitutional amendment? Scholars who 
have explicitly dealt with this question have focused on the debate 
between Madison and Sherman within the First Congress.
 The formulation of 
fundamental individual rights against encroachment by the newly 
formed federal government, therefore, was of pivotal importance at 
the First Congress in the spring and summer of 1789. Debates about 
the substance of the proposed amendments—proposals that eventually 
came into being as the Bill of Rights—were accompanied by a debate 
about the form of the amendments. While Madison initially proposed 
the amendments to be integrated and interwoven into the text of the 
original Constitution, Congress eventually decided to leave the text 
untouched and append the amendments after Article VII. After the 
first ten amendments came into existence in this supplementary form, 
this technique has been applied to each of the seventeen subsequent 
amendments. Congress’s decision in 1789, therefore, has set a 
precedent in favor of the supplementary form of amendments, a 
precedent that has not been challenged in constitutional practice or 
academic writing. 
12 They have 
emphasized that the decision in favor of Sherman’s approach of adding 
the amendments constitutes a concession by Madison, who preferred 
to interweave the amendments into the text of the Constitution, but 
surrendered his preference in form for the sake of achieving a 
consensus with regard to the substance of the amendments.13
 
note 
 
According to this reading, the decision in favor of the Sherman 
approach is conceived of as a political compromise. This is 
undoubtedly true; however, if seen only in this way, a significant 
characteristic of the 1789 decision is neglected almost completely—its 
arbitrary nature. The arbitrariness of the decision in favor of the 
supplementary form becomes clear if one adds to the picture four 
hitherto neglected aspects. First, the lack of guidance and examples 
that Congress could build its decision upon allowed for an open-ended 
debate about the form of the amendments. Second, the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of the decision is mirrored in the debate between 
Sherman and Madison. A closer examination of the debate leads to the 
1, at 117. 
 11. See John P. Kaminski, Restoring the Grand Security: The Debate over a Federal Bill 
of Rights 1787-1792, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 887, 889–912 (1993). 
 12. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 252–58; Marshall, supra note 8, at 96–112. 
 13. See id. 
87] CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS 91 
result that Madison had the better arguments and that the approach of 
Sherman and his supporters was based on a number of misconceptions 
about the nature of the Constitution. Third, the substance of the 
amendments that were debated as the first amendments to the 
Constitution also played a decisive role in determining the form of the 
amendments. Had the amendments proposed to the First Congress not 
dealt with the rather autonomous matter of fundamental rights but with 
a topic that had more explicitly required a change in the text of the 
Constitution, the debate could have taken a different course. Fourth, 
concerns regarding the practicability of incorporating amendments into 
the text might also have played a role. These four aspects will be 
examined in this section in order to highlight that the supplementary 
form of the amendment process is not only based on an arbitrary 
decision but also on a decision that was motivated by unpersuasive 
arguments. The third part of this article will examine how this 
arbitrary and unpersuasive decision has influenced the subsequent 
development of constitutional law and our contemporary understanding 
of the Constitution. 
 
 A.  Congress on its Own: The Lack of Guidance and of Examples  
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, if a state decides to 
craft a new constitution, it can look for guidance not only to the 
approximately 200 constitutions that are currently in force, but also to 
a long history of failed and effective constitution-making. In 1787, by 
contrast, the Philadelphia Convention could not resort to any such 
compilation of experience. When the Founders looked for guidance in 
constitutional design, their horizon probably encompassed the 
constitutions of the thirteen newly independent states, the Articles of 
Confederation, and the constitution of the Kingdom of Great Britain. 
But while these documents and sets of written and unwritten 
principles—along with the Declaration of Independence—gave some 
guidance with regard to substance, they were of only limited value 
with regard to the technique of amending. The Constitution of the 
United Kingdom does not consist of a single written document but is a 
set of documents and unwritten sources.14 No formal mechanism of 
amending the Constitution as a whole exists. The Articles of 
Confederation arranged for the possibility of amendments but no 
amendment ever came into force.15
 
 14. See, e.g., HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (5th ed. 
2004). 
 It is therefore pure speculation 
 15. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 2, at 285-86. 
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whether amendments to the Articles would have been integrated in the 
text or appended.16
Just as state constitutions were of little help to the Philadelphia 
Convention in 1787, they were again of little help to the Founders as 
examples with regard to the amendment procedure as such,
 
17 nor to 
the First Congress in 1789 with regard to the amendment technique. 
The Constitution of Connecticut of 177618 continued the 1662 Charter 
from the King of England,19 just as Rhode Island continued to be 
governed by the 1663 Charter from the King.20 Neither Charter 
encompassed an amendment mechanism. Similarly, the constitutions of 
New York,21 Virginia,22 and North Carolina23 did not explicitly 
provide for the possibility of amendment. And while the constitutions 
of New York and North Carolina were subsequently amended, these 
amendments occurred only after the meeting of the First Congress.24 
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 could be amended by the 
legislature, though it also determined that some of its provisions could 
not be amended.25 In 1777, the New Jersey legislature amended the 
Constitution substituting the words “State” and “States” for “colony” 
and “colonies.”26 The constitutions of South Carolina,27 Delaware,28
 
 16. It is, however, worth noting that when Congress, in 1785, considered an amendment 
to the Articles of Confederation, the Committee of the Whole submitted a proposition to alter the 
text of Article 9, ¶ 1 of the Articles. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836). 
 
 17. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 287–89. 
 18. CONN. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 257 (Benjamin 
Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter 1THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 19. CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 252. 
 20. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), reprinted in 2 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1595 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter 2 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 21. N.Y. CONST. (1777), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 20, at 1328. 
 22. VA. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 20, at 1910. 
 23. N.C. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS supra 
note 20, at 1409. 
 24. See N.Y. Amendments to the Constitution of 1777 (1801), reprinted in 2 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1339; N.C. Amendments to the 
Constitution of 1776 (1835 & 1854), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 20, at 1415. 
 25. N.J. CONST. art. XXIII (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1313. 
 26. See 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, Colonial Charters, supra note 20, at 
1310. 
 27. S.C. CONST. art. XLIV (1778), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1627. 
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Maryland,29 and Pennsylvania30 provided for their amendment, as did 
the 1784 Constitution of New Hampshire,31 but none were ever 
amended. Similarly, while Georgia’s Constitution of 1777 could be 
amended,32 as could its 1789 Constitution,33 amendments were not 
made before 1795.34 The Massachusetts Constitution of 178035 was not 
amended before 1822.36
In light of the above, when the First Congress convened in 1789 
to discuss amendments to the Constitution, it had only limited points 
of reference with regard to the question of how to amend a 
constitution. It was left with the text of Article V, which stipulates 
that amendments that are proposed and ratified in the procedure laid 
down in Article V “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part 
of this Constitution.”
 With the exception of New Jersey, which 
amended its 1776 Constitution by substituting one expression, the 
history of the state constitutions lacks any comprehensive or 
instructive illustration of constitutional amendment design. 
37 Article V neither specifies how the 
amendments shall become part of the Constitution, nor does the term 
“amendment” determine whether amendments should be annexed to or 
integrated in the text.38
 
 
 B.  Debating the Form of Amendments at the First Congress  
 
In the absence of clear normative predeterminations, the delegates 
to the First Congress were in the position to freely decide whether 
they wanted to integrate amendments into the Constitution or add them 
to the text. Madison assumed that amendments should be integrated 
 
 28. DEL. CONST. art. IX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 300. 
 29. MD. CONST. art. LIX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 828. 
 30. PA. CONST. § 47 (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 20, at 1548. 
 31. N.H. CONST. pt. II, unenumerated paragraph (1784), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1293. 
 32. GA. CONST. art. LXIII (1777), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 383. 
 33. GA. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (1789), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 387. 
 34. Ga. Amendments to the Constitution of 1789 (1795), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 387. 
 35. MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. VI, art. X (1780), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 972. 
 36. Mass. Amendments to the Constitution of 1780 (1822), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 973. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 38. Id. 
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into the text of the Constitution; thus, he proposed that a declaration 
recognizing popular sovereignty should be prefixed to the Constitution 
and that other substantive changes—which in part would later become 
the Bill of Rights—should be made through adding text into specific 
articles and sections of the original Constitution.39 Madison’s proposal 
was, however, not the only proposal that was on the table. 
Amendment proposals made by the state conventions were rather 
undecided as to the question of the amendment technique. The 
proposals made by Massachusetts,40 New Hampshire,41 and Virginia42 
encompassed only substantive changes without further specifying how 
these proposals should become part of the Constitution. The proposals 
of South Carolina and New York basically followed this same 
approach, yet they show that the legislatures of these states thought it 
legitimate to make changes to the original text of the Constitution.43 
South Carolina proposed to insert a word in Article VI, Section 3,44 
and New York proposed that the phrase “without the Consent of the 
Congress” be deleted from Article I, Section 9.45 Similarly, the House 
Committee Report suggested making changes directly to the text of the 
Constitution.46
 
 
1.  Sherman v. Madison 
 
The form of the amendments was debated first in the Committee 
of the Whole on August 13, 1789, and again in the House on August 
19, 1789.47
 
 39. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–36 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834) (recounting 
Madison’s introduction of proposed Amendments to the Constitution), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
 These debates followed sessions of the House in which the 
representatives intensely discussed whether it was too early to adopt 
1, at 11; see also Madison’s statements in the committee of the 
whole described in GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (June 10, 1789), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 66; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424–42  (1789), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 84–85. 
 40. Amendments proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (1788), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 14. 
 41. Amendments proposed by the New Hampshire Convention (1788), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 16. 
 42. Amendments proposed by the Virginia Convention (1788), reprinted in CREATING THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 17. 
 43. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 458–59. 
 44. Amendments proposed by the South Carolina Convention (1788), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 16. 
 45. Amendments proposed by the New York Convention (1788), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 28. 
 46. HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 29. 
 47. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 104, 197. 
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amendments to the Constitution and whether the House, the 
Committee of the Whole, or a select committee was the appropriate 
forum to discuss amendments.48 When the representatives eventually 
decided to move into the Committee of the Whole,49 Madison 
proposed an introductory paragraph that should precede the text of the 
Constitution.50 Sherman, who was generally opposed to discussing 
amendments and a Bill of Rights,51
 
 immediately objected to the 
proposal and opted for appending the amendments to the text of the 
original Constitution: 
I believe, [M]r. Chairman, this is not the proper mode of amending 
the [C]onstitution. We ought not to interweave our propositions into 
the work itself, because it will be destructive of the whole fabric. 
We might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to 
incorporate such heterogeneous articles; the one contradictory to the 
other. Its absurdity will be discovered by comparing it with a law: 
would any legislature endeavor to introduce into a former act a 
subsequent amendment, and let them stand so connected. When an 
alteration is made in an act, it is done by way of supplement; the 
latter act always repealing the former in every specified case of 
difference.52
 
 
This started a fierce debate about the right mode of amending the 
Constitution.53 Sherman and his supporters argued that Congress had 
no authority to alter the original document itself, which was made 
under the authority of the people.54 Amendments, by contrast, would 
not derive their authority from the people but from state 
governments.55
 
 48. See the debate taking place in May and June 1789 described in CREATING THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, supra note 
 Under this view, any alteration of the original 
1, at 57–103. 
 49. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 660–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 102–03. 
 50. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 104–05. 
 51. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 15. 
 52. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 117. 
 53. This debate is described by three different commentators: see THE DAILY ADVERTISER 
(Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 105–07; Gazette 
of the United States (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS , at 107–12; 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 703–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS , at 117–28. 
Since the debate is described most comprehensively in The Congressional Register, I will, in the 
following, primarily refer to this report. 
 54. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 117. 
 55. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 117, 125–26. 
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document would constitute a repeal to which Congress was not 
authorized.56 On the contrary, according to Sherman’s point of view, 
Congress could only pass “legislative acts,” which therefore should be 
detached from the Constitution and annexed.57 The amendments, 
therefore, should be kept clearly distinguishable from the original text 
so that “by a comparison, the world would discover the perfection of 
the original and the superfluity of the amendments.”58 Furthermore, 
alterations of the document would render the signatures of those who 
signed the document false and would obscure the fact that the 
Founders had only signed the original Constitution.59 Inserting 
amendments in the body of a law was unprecedented, and universal 
usage was to alter legal documents by supplementary acts.60 The 
Magna Carta, for example, had never been altered but only 
supplemented by other documents.61
Madison and his supporters, on the other hand, highlighted that 
the simplicity of the Constitution would be destroyed through 
supplementary amendments; incorporating the amendments would 
guarantee that the Constitution would remain “uniform and entire.”
 
62 
Through supplementary amendments, the Constitution could, in time, 
become too complex and obscure and thereby inaccessible to the 
people.63 Or, as Congressman John Vining described, the Constitution 
could, “like a careless written letter, have more matter attached to it 
in a postscript than was contained in the original composition.”64 
Additionally, the supplementary method could lead to incoherencies in 
situations when a clause in the original Constitution would be 
inconsistent with an amendment.65 Incorporating amendments would 
also avoid distorting the question of authority: the people themselves, 
through the state conventions, had expressed their wish for 
amendments.66
 
 56. Id. at 124. 
 Sherman’s proposal was problematic for supporters of 
incorporated amendments because it assumed that amendments were 
inferior to the original Constitution; such a proposition would defeat 
 57. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 105. 
 58. 1ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 120. 
 59. Id. at 120. 
 60. Id. at 119, 125. 
 61. Id. at 125. 
 62. Id. at 118. 
 63. Id. at 122, 123–24. 
 64. Id. at 120. 
 65. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 106. 
 66. Id. 
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the purpose of the amendments.67 In addition, some supporters 
referred to the text of Article V of the Constitution, which states that 
the amendments should become part of the Constitution.68 Therein, 
they saw a decision of the Constitution in favor of incorporating 
amendments.69
At the end of the debate, the Committee of the Whole voted in 
favor of Madison’s approach and decided that amendments should be 
integrated in the text of the Constitution.
 
70 In the following days, the 
substance of the proposed amendments was debated in detail. On 
August 19, 1789, however, Sherman repeated his motion for adding 
the amendments rather than integrating them in the text of the original 
Constitution.71 This time his motion—which was proposed to the 
House and not to the Committee of the Whole—passed.72 The 
Congressional Register only reports that a debate similar to the one on 
August 13, 1789, took place but does not further describe its content 
or offer any insights into why the House at this time decided against 
Madison and in favor of Sherman.73
The most convincing explanation for the change of mind in the 
House of Representatives lies in the increasingly tense atmosphere that 
characterized the debates in the House and that even lead to 
congressmen challenging each other to duels.
 The Senate, whose deliberations 
were secret and are not reported, did not change this decision. 
74 Against this 
background, and against the background of some of the congressmen 
generally opposing the adoption of amendments, the decision in favor 
of Sherman has to be seen as a concession of Madison toward his 
opponents.75 Although Madison was strongly in favor of the 
interweaving method as more than a mere preference of form, he had 
already signaled to Sherman that he was willing to compromise on this 
point.76
 
 67. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 
 This reading is supported by a letter from James Madison to 
Alexander White: 
1, at 122, 127. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 69. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 118, 121–22. 
 70. Id. at 128. 
 71. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 197. 
 72. Id. at 197–98. 
 73. Id. at 198. 
 74. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 256–58; CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, 
at xv. 
 75. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 110–12. 
 76. 1ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 118. 
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The substance of the report of the Committee of eleven has not been 
much varied. It became an unavoidable sacrifice to a few who knew 
their concurrence to be necessary, to the despatch [sic] if not the 
success of the business, to give up the form by which the amendts. 
[sic] when ratified would have fallen into the body of the 
Constitution, in favor of the project of adding them by way of 
appendix to it.77
 
 
Thus, it appears clear that Madison gave up his preferred form of 
amending in order to save the substance of the Bill of Rights, to 
facilitate its adoption by Congress, and to improve its prospects for 
success. 
 
2.  Assessment of the debate 
 
It would be easy to treat the debate between Madison and Sherman 
as any other political debate and to simply declare that Sherman 
won—be it due to having the better arguments or due to the political 
circumstances that led Madison to give in. However, a closer 
examination of the arguments that Sherman and his supporters brought 
forward reveals that they were informed by misconceptions about the 
nature of the Constitution and of constitutional law. Moreover, from 
the perspective of the twenty-first century, their goals in pursuing 
appended amendments rather than incorporated ones have not been 
achieved. 
 
a.  Heterogeneity.  The first argument against interweaving the 
amendments was the heterogeneity of the articles that would be 
destructive “of the whole fabric” of the Constitution. This argument is 
difficult to evaluate from the outset. The original Constitution 
encompasses a variety of very heterogeneous provisions dealing with a 
broad variety of issues. The main theme is of course the structure of 
the new national government as well as the relationship to the states. 
However, even within this homogeneous matter, the original 
Constitution contains procedural as well as substantive regulations, 
text of different degrees of generality, and dissimilar provisions 
standing side-by-side, such as: the entrenchment of slave trade,78 the 
state of the Union address,79 and the right to trial by jury.80
 
 77. Letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
 Against 
1, at 287. 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 79. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 80. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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this background, it is hard to see how the proposed amendments 
would qualitatively change the homogeneity of the Constitution. As 
individual rights and limits on the powers of the national government, 
they fit in neatly with the original document, a document that as 
Madison and Hamilton emphasized, was designed by the very 
structure of the government it establishes as a guarantee of individual 
rights.81
 
 Even if one agrees with Sherman’s perception of the 
heterogeneity of the amendments, it would seem even more convincing 
to integrate them into the text of the original Constitution in order to 
clarify their relationship with the original text. 
b.  Unprecedented nature.  Another argument brought against 
interweaving the amendments into the text was that such a technique 
would be unprecedented. Sherman referred to the general process of 
lawmaking, in which a subsequent act would not alter the text of the 
original act but be added as a supplement, specifying which parts of 
the original act it repeals.82 James Jackson from Georgia added the 
example of the British Constitution in which the Magna Carta would 
not be altered by an amendment.83 The reference to the precedential 
value of British constitutionalism is, however, not very convincing. 
The creation of the American Constitution undoubtedly relied heavily 
on the British tradition and incorporated numerous constitutional 
elements, such as the habeas corpus provisions84 and the right to 
trial.85 At the same time, the Constitution incorporates numerous 
elements that decisively depart from the British model and in fact 
constitute an explicit repudiation of the governmental regime of the 
former colonial power. The form of the Constitution in particular 
constitutes a significant break with the tradition of British 
constitutionalism. Unlike the unwritten British Constitution, Americans 
chose to codify the basic rules and principles of their government in a 
comprehensive and holistic, single, written document.86
 
 81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 581 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 Since the 
British Constitution does not have an explicit mechanism for 
amendment, it is hardly convincing to derive conclusions about the 
technique of constitutional amendment from the British example. 
 82. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 117. 
 83. Id. at 125. 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 85. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 86. On the nature of the British Constitution as a mainly unwritten document and on the 
processes in which the British Constitution may be changed, see, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 14, 
at 8–10. 
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The reference to the general tradition of lawmaking is more 
convincing. It would seem natural for the constitution makers to 
imitate this example and to make “alterations” to the original 
document by way of supplementary amendments. However, there are 
some important differences between the Constitution and acts of 
ordinary lawmaking that cast doubts on this analogy. Unlike legislative 
statutes, the Constitution provides for the possibility of its own 
amendment.87 While statutes can be repealed and replaced at the will 
of the legislature, the Constitution contains a special amendment 
procedure, the task of which is to ensure that the people do not have 
to replace the whole Constitution every time they want to change parts 
of it. There are two ways in which the people can express their will: 
through giving themselves a new constitution or through changing the 
existing Constitution through amendments.88
An inquiry into constitutional history further casts into doubt the 
presumption of Sherman and his supporters as to the impossibility and 
inappropriateness of interweaving amendments into the text of the 
original Constitution. Already under the Articles of Confederation, 
amendments had been proposed in a way that would have altered the 
text of the Articles.
 Unlike a statute which 
can be repealed and replaced by the legislature at will, the 
Constitution is designated to be the foundational document of the 
Union government. This difference limits the immediate transferability 
of the model of changing statutes to the constitutional amendment 
process. 
89 With regard to the adoption of a Bill of Rights 
as a supplement to the Constitution, the amendment proposals brought 
forward by the state conventions show that altering the text of the 
Constitution was not as unthinkable as Sherman portrayed it. The 
proposals of South Carolina and New York encompassed explicit 
changes to the text of the original Constitution.90 There are no 
indications that either of the two state conventions regarded this 
technique as problematic. The same is true for Madison’s proposal. 
While the congressmen at the First Congress could not foresee the 
subsequent development, an examination of the practice of the state 
constitutions91
 
 87. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 shows that the interweaving model is not as far-fetched 
 88. As to the exclusiveness of the Article V amendment procedure, see references, supra 
notes 4 and 5. 
 89. See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836). 
 90. Amendments proposed by the South Carolina Convention (1788), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 16; Amendments proposed by the New York 
Convention (1788), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 28. 
 91. Observations about the state constitutions in the following and throughout this paper 
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as Sherman believed. Of the fifty state constitutions which are 
currently in force, only the 1901 constitution of Alabama,92 the 1872 
constitution of West Virginia,93 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780,94 follow the example of the federal Constitution and add 
amendments to the text in supplementary form.95 All other state 
constitutions—many of which date back to the eighteenth or nineteenth 
century—allow for alterations of and additions to the original text.96
 
 
This background seriously challenges Sherman’s assumption with 
regard to the extraordinary character of Madison’s interweaving 
proposal. 
c.  Sources of authority.  Turning to more substantive opposition 
against interweaving amendments into the text, Sherman argued that 
the Constitution and the amendments derived their authority from two 
different sources and should therefore not be intermingled. This 
argument touches upon the allegedly different nature of constitution 
making and constitutional amendment. According to Sherman, the 
former is an act of the people “at large,” whereas the latter, is only an 
act of the state governments.97 According to Sherman, the people had 
authorized Congress only to make amendments, not to repeal the 
Constitution.98
First, the Constitution came into force as the result of a proposal 
 Thus, Sherman would have perhaps referred to the 
pivotal distinction in constitutional theory between the power that 
creates the constitution (pouvoir constituant) and the power that is 
created by and exercises powers derived from the constitution (pouvoir 
constitué). Sherman’s assumption that the Constitution and the 
amendments stem from two different sources of authority, however, 
has to be criticized on the basis of constitutional practice and theory as 
well as with regard to its internal coherence. 
 
are based on an examination of the fifty constitutions as they are presented on the official 
websites of the state legislatures. 
 92. ALA. CONST. (1901). 
 93. W. VA. CONST. (1872). 
 94. MASS. CONST. (1780). 
 95. Furthermore, the constitutions of Alabama and Massachusetts differ from the federal 
model. They add amendments to the original text in a manner resembling the federal 
Constitution. Unlike the amendments of the federal Constitution, however, amendments under 
the Alabama and Massachusetts constitutions can add text to or annul parts of the original 
constitutions. The only instance in which the federal Constitution resembles this process is the 
Twenty-First Amendment which explicitly repeals the Eighteenth Amendment. 
 96. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. (1938). The New York Constitution has been modified 
numerous times since it entered into force, and it indicates after each article and section when a 
certain provision had been altered by a constitutional amendment. 
 97. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 704 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 117, 125–26. 
 98. Id. 
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by the Philadelphia Convention and the subsequent ratification by 
conventions of at least nine states.99 It has been pointed out that, 
although the ratification did not occur through statewide referenda, the 
participation of the people through the ratifying state conventions was 
significantly more democratic than any process of constitution making 
known before.100 In contrast, amendments are regularly proposed by 
Congress and ratified by state legislatures. Apart from the fact that 
Article V also encompasses at least the theoretical possibility of 
ratification by state conventions,101 the confrontation of “the people” 
ratifying the Constitution as opposed to state legislatures ratifying the 
amendments is too simplistic. The relationship between the people as 
the bearer of popular sovereignty and state institutions as 
representatives of the people is one of the most complex subjects of 
democratic theory. Popular sovereignty is the main theme of American 
constitutionalism, and it is among the pivotal achievements of the 
American Founding. It is fair to say that the Constitution is regarded 
as a foundational document establishing the government, and not as 
the result of a bargaining process between the governed and the 
governing. If one conceives of the American Constitution as a 
contract,102 it is a contract between the individuals and not between the 
people and the governing entities;103 however, “the people” as an 
entity are in need of modes of representation. Just as conventions are 
a form of representation of the people,104
 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 Congress and the state 
legislatures are a different form of representation. One might argue 
that state conventions are more democratic than Congress and state 
legislatures, and that the former therefore represents the people more 
accurately than the latter. This does not make the former an 
embodiment of the people and the latter only a representative. 
Borrowing the terminology employed by Bruce Ackerman: 
representation of the people is never mimetic representation in which 
the representative entity is to be equated with the people, but is only 
symbolic representation, embracing the awareness that the 
 100. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 5 (1980); AMAR, supra note 2, at 7. 
 101. According to Article V, Congress can choose whether ratification shall occur through 
the state legislatures or through state conventions. See U.S. CONST. art V. 
 102. Madison himself refers to the concept of a “social compact.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 103. See CHRISTIAN WINTERHOFF, VERFASSUNG – VERFASSUNGGEBUNG – 
VERFASSUNGSÄNDERUNG 17–19 (2007). 
 104. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 
306–343 (1969) (discussing the concept of conventions as representative assemblies outside of the 
institutionalized framework of regularly constituted authorities); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 
5, at 174–75 (arguing that the convention could speak for the people with “greater political 
legitimacy” than any existing political institution). 
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representative body is not the same as the entity it is supposed to 
represent but only a representative in a symbolic way.105
Furthermore, while it might be true that at the end of the 
eighteenth century the state conventions were more democratic than 
the state legislatures, this argument loses its force with regard to 
subsequent amendments. The Reconstruction Amendments as well as 
most of the amendments of the twentieth century have led to an 
extension of voting rights to groups that were previously excluded 
from the political process: blacks, women, and eighteen-year-olds.
 The original 
Constitution, as well as the amendments to the Constitution, are 
therefore creations of representatives of the people, and both derive 
their ultimate legitimacy from the people as the bearer of popular 
sovereignty. 
106
Second, and turning to the realm of constitutional theory, Sherman 
implies that the amendments possess an inferior degree of authority 
than the original Constitution.
 
Similar developments took place on the state level. An amendment that 
entered into force in the twentieth century or that will be decided upon 
in the twenty-first century thereby derives its legitimacy from a 
Congress and from state legislatures, which more accurately and 
comprehensively represent the people than any other political 
institution at any point in time before. 
107 As a matter of constitutional theory, 
the authority to make the constitution lies with the pouvoir constituant, 
and the authority to change the constitution is vested in the pouvoir 
constitué.108 Whereas the act of constitution making constitutes a 
genuine act of popular sovereignty, amendments to the constitution 
derive their authority from the constitution itself and are therefore, a 
legal act by an already constituted political power. While this 
differentiation is essential in terms of constitutional theory, it does not 
entail a lower degree of legal or political authority of the amendments. 
At first sight, one might be tempted to argue in favor of a lower 
authority of constitutional amendments in light of the farther reaching 
powers of the pouvoir constituant in comparison to the pouvoir 
constitué. While the former is legally unrestricted in exercising its 
powers of constitution making,109
 
 105. See ACKERMAN, supra note 
 the latter may exercise its 
5, at 179–86. 
 106. See ELY, supra note 100, at 98–99. 
 107. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 117, 125–26. 
 108. This distinction was famously pronounced by EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, WHAT IS 
THE THIRD ESTATE? (1964). 
 109. With regard to contemporary processes of constitution making, it may, however, not 
be neglected that international law increasingly posits external legal influences on the constitution 
making process. See, e.g., Philipp Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir 
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amendment powers only within the procedures laid out by the 
Constitution. The amendment powers can also be substantially 
restricted by entrenched constitutional provisions that are kept from 
the disposal of the amendment power. Under the U.S. Constitution, 
the equal representation of the states within the Senate is not 
amendable without the consent of every state, and, until 1808, the 
slave trade clauses110 were exempted from the amendment process.111
This conclusion is furthermore supported by the text of the 
Constitution. According to Article V, amendments “shall be valid to 
all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution.”
 
In the process of constitution making, the people as the pouvoir 
constituant arguably are not subject to restrictions of this kind. 
However, this difference in authority of the pouvoir constituant and 
the pouvoir constitué does not entail a different authority of the 
original Constitution and subsequent amendments. It does not endow 
the original Constitution with a higher degree of normative force than 
the amendments. The different degree of authority of the pouvoir 
constituant and the pouvoir constitué applies to the original 
Constitution and to the amendments in the same way: both are at the 
disposition of the pouvoir constituant. As a matter of constitutional 
theory, the people, at any point in time, have the power and capacity 
to repeal the Constitution—the original Constitution and the 
amendments alike—and to engage in an act of genuine constitution 
making. Constitutional theory thereby does not imply a different 
degree of authority between the original text of the Constitution and 
the amendments. 
112 As a matter 
of legal authority, the Constitution explicitly stipulates the equal status 
of original Constitution and subsequent amendments. Original 
Constitution and constitutional amendments are evenly part of the 
“supreme Law of the Land.”113
Third, and finally, Sherman’s assumption that Congress has the 
authority to amend but not to repeal the Constitution is not 
maintainable in its generality. While Congress could not repeal the 
Constitution as a whole, the amendment procedure allows Congress to 
 If the people express their will 
through the act of constitution making, the U.S. Constitution exposes 
the explicit will of the people that the amendments shall have the same 
force and authority as the original Constitution. 
 
Constituant – Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, 10 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 423 (2006). 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 and cl. 4. 
 111. Id. art. V. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. 
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substantively repeal almost all parts of the Constitution. Under the 
current Constitution, only the equal suffrage of each state in the 
Senate is immune from amendment, unless every state consents.114 
The amendments, even though they are added to the original 
Constitution and do not alter the text, substantively repeal parts of the 
original Constitution. The Bill of Rights limits Congress’s power to 
legislate, thereby altering its powers under Article I.115 Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not alter the text of the original 
Constitution, but it substantively repeals parts of Article I, Section 2, 
Clause 3.116 The first section of the Seventeenth Amendment, which 
stipulates that the Senators shall be elected by the people of the state, 
repeals Article I, Section 3, Clause 1. The Twelfth, Twentieth and 
Twenty-Fifth Amendments repeal and modify the procedure of 
Presidential election and the President’s term of office in Article II, 
Section 1. Congress’s power to amend the Constitution is not limited 
to adding provisions but encompasses altering and repealing provisions 
of the original Constitution.117
 
 
d.  The need to distinguish.  Finally, the proponents of the 
supplementary approach highlighted the need to maintain a clear 
distinction between the text of the original Constitution and the 
amendments. They wanted future generations to be able to compare 
the original text with the amendments and thereby discover the 
“superfluity” of the amendments.118 They deemed it improper to 
interweave subsequent amendments into a text that was signed by the 
Founding Fathers.119 The latter objection is without merit. As New 
York Congressman Egbert Benson rightly pointed out, Madison’s 
approach would not have led to an actual change of the original 
Constitution, which would remain untouched in the archives of the 
United States.120
 
 114. Id. art. V. On the question of natural rights limitations of the amendment process, see 
Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L. J. 1073, 1084–89 
(1991). 
 It would at any time be visible—or at least traceable 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 116. Id. 
 117. The same thought is expressed by Massachusetts Congressman Elbridge Gerry. See 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 712 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 122 (“It is said, if the amendments are incorporated it will be a 
virtual repeal of the Constitution. I say the effect will be the same in a supplementary way, 
consequently the objection goes for nothing, or it goes against making any amendments 
whatever.”). 
 118. 1ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 120. 
 119. Id. at 120. 
 120. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 713 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 1, at 123. 
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through a view into the records of Congress—which formulations were 
part of the original text and which alterations were made at which 
point in time. Contemporary copies of the Constitution in effect could 
highlight, for example through footnotes or an accompanying 
explanatory commentary, how and when the text had been changed. 
The Founding Fathers signed the Constitution with the text of Article 
V in it. They were undoubtedly aware of the possibility of subsequent 
alterations to the text and reasonably expected such alterations to 
occur. 
The assumption that amendments should be clearly distinguishable 
from the original Constitution in order to prove the “superfluity” of 
the amendments indicates that Sherman and his supporters did not only 
care about the “right” way to make amendments in terms of juridical 
handcraft. Their proposal was primarily motivated by their opposition 
against including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, as Philadelphia 
Congressman George Clymer’s remark with regard to the superfluity 
of the amendments clearly shows.121
 
 More than 200 years of 
constitutional developments have proven Sherman and his supporters 
wrong and placed the Bill of Rights—especially in correlation with the 
subsequent Reconstruction Amendments—at the top of the 
contemporary constitutional canon. The role the supplementary form 
of the amendments might have played in the track record of the Bill of 
Rights will be examined in Part III. 
 C.  The Connection Between Substance and Form of the First 
Amendments  
 
Another aspect that might have influenced the outcome of the 
debate between Madison and Sherman is the content of the actual 
amendments that were debated at the First Congress. Among the main 
purposes of the Congress was the formulation of fundamental rights 
against encroachment by the federal government. To be sure, other 
provisions were also discussed at the First Congress, and the twelve 
amendments to the Constitution that were eventually adopted by 
Congress on September 28, 1789, included not only the Bill of Rights 
but also two provisions on the ratio of representation in the House of 
Representatives and on the compensation of the members of Congress 
respectively.122
 
 121. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 710 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 
 However, at the center of the debates were the 
1, at 120. 
 122. Amendments to the Constitution art. I and II (Sep. 28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3. Both Amendments initially failed to achieve the 
required number of ratifications by the state legislatures, therefore turning Articles III to XII of 
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individual rights now guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 
This substance matter of the proposed amendments might have 
played into the hands of Sherman and his supporters. Even though the 
Bill of Rights has been characterized as “more episodic and thus less 
obviously coherent in character” than the text of the 1789 
Constitution,123 the ten amendments—with the exception of the Tenth 
Amendment— were understood as embracing the same idea and 
thereby building a unity.124 It was therefore easily conceivable that the 
amendments could be annexed to the Constitution, with the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights as two separate but connected texts. 
Although the reports of the First Congress do not encompass any hints 
in this direction, the Congressmen could even resort to a precedent for 
such a technique: in 1776 the state of Virginia adopted a Bill of 
Rights125 and, in a separate document, a constitution.126 Going back in 
time even further, Congress could draw upon the constitutional history 
of Britain in which the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right of 
1628, the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill of Rights of 1689 
provided numerous examples of individual rights guarantees united in 
a single document.127
The Bill of Rights was therefore a thankful candidate to be added 
to the Constitution in the form of an annex. It contained a certain 
degree of coherence and unity. Congress could rely on precedents of 
similarly designed rights declarations. Although the Bill of Rights 
affects the original Constitution, it does not explicitly change any 
provision of the original text.
 
128 While the first ten amendments could 
have been interwoven into the text—as Madison’s proposal shows129
 
Congress’s Amendments into the Bill of Rights that became the first ten amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution. The second of the two initially proposed articles has been ratified in 1992 and is 
now in force as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. See generally Richard B. Bernstein, The 
Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 497 (1992). 
—
it did not seem as necessary and natural as it would have seemed, had 
 123. ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 34. 
 124. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1132 (1991). 
 125. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1908. 
 126. VA. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 20, at 1910. 
 127. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 22–28. 
 128. See Robert A. Goldwin, Congressman Madison Proposes Amendments to the 
Constitution, reprinted in THE FRAMERS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 57, 62 (Robert A. Licht 
ed., 1991) (“All of the ratified articles were additions, not amendments.”). 
 129. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–36 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed. 1834) (recounting 
Madison’s introduction of proposed Amendments to the Constitution), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 11; see also Hartnett, supra note 8, at 258–64. 
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the First Congress discussed amendments which would have required 
an explicit repeal or alteration of the original Constitution. Had the 
First Congress, for example, discussed a change to the election 
process of the Senate, which—as the Seventeenth Amendment does 
now—demanded a change of Article I, Section 3, Clause 1, it would 
have been more obvious to alter the provision in the article of the 
original Constitution than to formulate such a change in a 
supplementary amendment. When the New Jersey legislature in 1777 
decided to amend the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 by substituting 
the word “State” for “colony,”130
 
 it probably seemed natural to the 
representatives to alter the term throughout the document instead of 
formulating a single amendment stating that henceforth the term 
“colony” should be read as “state.” Had the First Congress been 
faced with a similar change to the Constitution, it might have 
intuitively followed the New Jersey example. 
 D.  Practical Problems  
 
From the perspective of the twenty-first century, the amendment 
of a legal document does not pose significant challenges with regard to 
the practical and technological implementation. Legal texts are 
officially published and reliably distributed. It is seldom problematic 
to identify the law currently in force. Online publications furthermore 
facilitate this process. By contrast, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, practical obstacles in the amendment of a legal text might 
have played a more dominant role. If amendments were integrated into 
the text of the Constitution, every amendment would have required the 
publication of a completely new text. Not only the higher costs of this 
manner of production might have played a role, but also the fear of 
numerous different versions of the Constitution circulating with the 
difficulty of identifying the currently valid version. If the text of the 
original Constitution was not changed, the already circulating versions 
of the Constitution would remain valid. Only the newly established 
amendments would have needed to be published and circulated. 
 
 E.  Conclusion  
 
The decision of the First Congress to add amendments to the 
original text of the Constitution instead of integrating them into the 
text has been influenced by a variety of factors. A lack of precedents 
 
 130. 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, Colonial Charters, supra note 20, at 
1310. 
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allowed Congress to freely debate the amendment technique. The 
debate between Madison and Sherman reveals that the proponents of 
the supplementary form did not only have the less persuasive 
arguments but were also misinformed as to the nature of the 
Constitution and the significance of the Bill of Rights. Turning more 
to the realm of speculation, the substance of the amendments discussed 
by the First Congress, as well as practical concerns about the 
implementation of Madison’s approach, might have also facilitated 
support for Sherman’s proposal. In conclusion, the decision of the 
First Congress to add amendments to the Constitution in a 
supplementary form seems, to a certain degree, arbitrary. It was not 
only misinformed, but its decision was the result of a political bargain 
between proponents and opponents of the Bill of Rights, with the latter 
trying to diminish the meaning of the amendments. The opponents 
were motivated by their opposition against the Bill of Rights and also 
by their concern with and respect for the original Constitution.131
 
 With 
these peculiarities of the amendment technique in mind, we can now 
turn to the question of whether and how the decision in favor of 
Sherman’s approach has influenced subsequent constitutional 
developments. 
 III.  CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
The somewhat arbitrary nature of the decision in favor of 
appending amendments to the Constitution rather than integrating them 
could be disregarded as a neat peculiarity of constitutional history if it 
was simply a question of form. Yet, as Madison rightly pointed out in 
1789, “on this occasion . . . form is of some consequence.”132 
Similarly, his opponent Sherman insisted that they were not only 
debating a question of form.133
 
 But what exactly are the consequences 
of the form that was chosen by the First Congress? In the following, I 
will examine the impact of the supplementary mode of constitutional 
amendment (A) on the practice of constitutional amendment, (B) on 
the symbolic nature of the Constitution, and (C) on the character of 
the Bill of Rights. Eventually, I will analyze (D) whether the 
amendment technique has any significance for the interpretation of the 
amendments and (E) for our understanding of the significant turning 
points of constitutional history. 
 
 131. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 101. 
 132. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 708 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 118. 
 133. Id. at 715. 
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 A.  Probability and Significance of Constitutional Amendments  
 
As pointed out in the Introduction, constitutional amendments play 
an important role in American constitutional law. However, this is 
only half the truth considering the remarkably small number of 
successful amendments. While the Bill of Rights and the 
Reconstruction Amendments constitute major constitutional 
achievements of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, other major 
events and developments of constitutional dimension have not been 
formally translated into constitutional amendments. During the radical 
changes encompassed by the New Deal Revolution, proposals for 
amendments did not play a significant role.134 The Civil Rights 
Revolution of the 1960s did not culminate into a formal change of the 
Constitution.135 The Equal Rights Amendment was proposed by 
Congress but did not achieve the required ratification by three-fourths 
of the states.136 In the current debate about same-sex marriage, 
constitutional amendments mainly play a role as constitutional bans on 
same-sex marriage, as they exist in numerous state constitutions and 
were proposed on the national level through the Federal Marriage 
Amendment.137
The shrinking significance of formal amendments to the 
Constitution has led constitutional scholars and practitioners to search 
for alternative ways of transforming social change into constitutional 
law. Bruce Ackerman, most famously argues for the recognition of the 
New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution as constitutional moments 
on equal footing with the Founding and Reconstruction.
 
138 As a 
consequence, Ackerman argues that the constitutional canon should be 
expanded to encompass not only the written text of the Constitution 
but also landmark cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,139 and 
superstatutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1968.140
 
 134. See ACKERMAN, supra note 
 Reva Siegel 
highlights how even the failed Equal Rights Amendment has 
influenced the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the Fourteenth 
3, at 312–44. 
 135. However, the Twenty-Third to Twenty-Sixth Amendments, enacted between 1961 and 
1971, expanded the scope of voting rights and aimed at precluding restrictions on the right to 
vote. U.S. CONST. amends. XXIII-XXVI. 
 136. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment reads as follows: “Section 1. Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex. Section. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. Section. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years 
after the date of ratification.” 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). 
 137. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 138. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 58–80; Ackerman counterplea, supra note 3, at 1737. 
 139. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 140. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968). 
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Amendment, taking into account the role of social movements in 
influencing constitutional interpretation.141
The connection between the formal requirements for an 
amendment and the low number of amendments is obvious. The high 
watermark of achieving a two-thirds majority in both houses of 
Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states
 At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, social and political movements try to bring about 
constitutional change through strategic court appointees and changes in 
the interpretation of the Constitution. The formal amendment process 
plays only a subordinate role. 
142 has only 
seldom been achieved. But the supplementary design of the 
amendments might also have had an influence on the practice and 
politics of constitutional amendments. Akhil Amar has pointed out that 
the supplementary form of the amendments demonstrates the 
“incompleteness” of the Constitution and shows the American 
Constitution as a “work in progress.”143 The “vast creative white 
space at the bottom” of the document thereby signals room for further 
amendments.144 This theoretically compelling understanding of the 
amendment design is, however, rather harshly contrasted by the reality 
of the very low number of successful amendments. While the 
amendment design is certainly not among the most significant factors 
explaining the low-key use of the amendment mechanism, it might 
nevertheless have contributed to it. Constitutions that do not follow the 
American model, but allow for alterations of the text itself, experience 
amendments of different importance. While some amendments entail 
significant substantial changes in constitutional law, other changes are 
of a more cosmetic nature or have a clarifying meaning.145 In federal 
systems, constitutions regularly encompass catalogues of competences 
that are vested in either the federal or the state level.146 Constitutional 
orders that allow for alterations of the text enable the political actors 
to more easily shift competences between the different federal 
levels.147
 
 141. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 Under the U.S. Constitution, by contrast, such clarifying 
 142. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 143. AMAR, supra note 2, at 460. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Under the German Constitution of 1949 (“German Basic Law”), for example, Article 
I § 3 stipulates that the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution shall bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. In its original version the article limited 
the executive to the administration (Verwaltung). In 1956 a constitutional amendment changed 
the text to the broader term “executive power” (vollziehende Gewalt). 
 146. See, e.g., Articles 73, 74, and 75 of the German Basic Law, granting legislative 
powers to the federal level (Bund) and to the states (Länder). 
 147. In 2006, for example, the German Basic Law was reorganized with regard to the 
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changes and alterations in specific powers are more difficult. While 
the Sixteenth Amendment148 arguably had a clarifying function with 
regard to Article I, Section 9, Paragraph 4,149
Whether the supplementary form of the amendments actually had 
such a decelerating effect on the practice of constitutional amendments 
is hard to examine empirically. Numerous factors contribute to the 
limited practical importance of the Article V procedure; among them, 
are the high requirements for constitutional amendments and the 
political landscape that is dominated by two ideologically dichotomic 
political parties. In this light, a comparison with the constitutions of 
other countries would not be conclusive. The comparably limited 
number of successful amendments is primarily due to the fact that the 
U.S. Constitution is among the constitutions with the most difficult 
amendment procedure.
 no amendment has 
touched upon the competences of Congress under Article I, Section 8. 
This is even more remarkable considering that the distribution of 
powers between the federal and the state level is among the most 
controversial topics of American constitutional law. But no amendment 
aims at clarifying the term “Commerce” in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 of the Constitution or the contentious scope of the 
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This is, of course, mainly due to the fact that it is difficult to achieve 
the necessary political consensus required by Article V of the 
Constitution. But as a complementary factor, it seems more difficult to 
incorporate such changes in an isolated amendment than it would be to 
propose an alteration of the text. It would have been relatively easy to 
add the words “and to print paper money” to the power of Congress 
to coin money under Article I, Section 8, Clause 5;but as a separate 
amendment clarifying that Congress’s power to coin money includes 
the issuance of paper money seems more difficult to achieve 
politically. Opponents might argue that it would be inappropriate to 
“waste” a whole amendment on such an issue. 
150
 
allocation of legislative competences between the Bund and the Länder, see Gesetz zur Änderung 
des Grundgesetzes (Act Amending the Basic Law), Aug. 28, 2006, BGBl. I at 2034 (F.R.G.). 
 And even an examination of the state 
constitutions is not very insightful and does not reveal a connection 
between the mode of amendment and the number of successful 
amendments. Currently, only the state constitutions of Alabama, West 
 148. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes 
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”). 
 149. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. (“No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 
AMERICAN POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362 (1994). 
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Virginia, and Massachusetts follow the model of the federal 
Constitution.151 Taking into account the duration of the constitutions, 
West Virginia and Massachusetts are among the state constitutions that 
have been amended the least.152 Alabama, on the other hand, is the 
state constitution with the highest rate of amendments. As of today, 
827 amendments have been added to the original 1901 Constitution of 
Alabama—18 of which deal with the operation of the game “Bingo” in 
the different counties of Alabama.153 The mere fact that a constitution 
follows the supplementary model therefore does not entail a low 
number of amendments. However, Alabama might be a bad example 
for a comparison with the federal Constitution. The Alabama 
Constitution, even in its original form of 1901, is the longest state 
constitution. It consists of 287 sections and regulates in great detail 
matters that, at least from the perspective of the federal Constitution, 
do not seem to belong to constitutional law substantively. The 
examples of the state constitutions may in general be of no guidance 
for understanding the amendment process of the federal Constitution: 
unlike the federal Constitution, state constitutions are relatively “easy 
to amend” and they are more often amended.154
Nevertheless, the example of Alabama may show why federal 
legislators may be reluctant to add too many amendments to the 
federal Constitution. A federal Constitution with several hundred 
amendments would no longer be a concise document accessible to the 
people as the Founding Fathers wanted it to be. It would become the 
“careless written letter” Congressman Vining feared.
 
155
 
 
 B.  The Symbolic Dimension of the Constitution  
 
This leads over to the question of the influence of the amendment 
technique on the symbolic dimension and nature of the Constitution.156
 
 151. See supra notes 92 to 95 and accompanying text. 
 
A constitution is the legal foundation of a national polity. It 
establishes, legitimates, and limits public power. But beyond its legal 
significance, a constitution ideally also has a symbolic function and is 
a document with which the people can identify. In this regard, the 
supplementary mode of constitutional amendment may be a virtue. It 
 152. See the data provided by Lutz, supra note 150, at 367. 
 153. ALA. CONST. (1901). 
 154. See Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 676 (2002). 
 155. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 710 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 120. 
 156. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 97 (“The debate over the form of amendments was first 
a debate over the nature of a constitution.”) 
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unfolds the historical context of the original Constitution and of the 
single amendments. Furthermore, it openly acknowledges the 
imperfectness of the original Constitution and past mistakes of 
American history.157
While it is true that the supplementary amendment technique may 
have this effect, a similar result is regularly achieved by modern 
constitutions through the preamble. The preamble of a constitution 
establishes and highlights the historical context and background in 
which the constitution came into being. Against the background of 
World War II, the preamble of the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, for example, highlights the German people’s 
responsibility before God and man, their determination to promote 
world peace, and their position as an equal partner in a united 
Europe.
 The reader can become aware of the 
achievements of the Founding moment, of the shortcomings of past 
generations, as well as of the democratic accomplishments of 
subsequent decades. 
158 It also encompassed a reference to the separation of 
Germany into West and East, a reference that was replaced after re-
unification by a reference to the unity and free self-determination of 
the German people in 1990.159 The preamble of the 1996 Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa begins with a reference to the 
injustices of the past, and emphasizes that the Constitution is deemed 
to “heal the divisions of the past” and “build a united and democratic 
South Africa.”160
Embedding references to historical background—whether they are 
positive, as the American Founding or German reunification, or 
negative, as slavery, the abhorrence of the Second World War, or 
apartheid—in the preamble, rather than in the operative part of a 
constitution, may have further advantages. First, it may make the 
context clearer. While the original U.S. Constitution encompasses 
substantial references to slavery, it avoids the term slavery. Rather, it 
contrasts slaves with free Persons and speaks of “all other 
Persons,”
 South Africa’s history of apartheid is thereby clearly 
visible in the preamble of its Constitution. 
161 of the “migration or importation of Persons,”162
 
 157. AMAR, supra note 
 or of 
2, at 460–61; see also Hartnett, supra note 8, at 264 (highlighting 
that the virtue of Madison’s approach would be to permit the elimination of “noxious 
provisions”). 
 158. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, pmbl. (23 May 1949). 
 159. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, pmbl. (as amended on 23 
September 1990). 
 160. S. AFR. CONST., pmbl. (1996). 
 161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868). 
 162. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. (amended 1913). 
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“Person[s] held to Service or Labour.”163
Madison’s approach would have had another advantage over the 
supplementary mode of amending. Substantive parts of today’s 
Constitution—especially the provisions concerning the Electoral 
College and suffrage—are scattered all over the Constitution and the 
amendments, making it difficult to identify the valid constitutional 
rules. A reader who is not familiar with constitutional law might be 
deeply confused when, after having read Article II, Section 1, Clause 
3, he reaches the Twelfth Amendment. Similarly, if he wants to find 
out who is eligible to vote, he will have to complement his reading of 
the first Articles with the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth, 
and arguably the Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Having all these 
provisions bundled together would more immediately give the reader 
an actual impression of the people’s participation in the political 
process. In order for the people to identify with their Constitution, it 
is not only necessary that the document reminds them of their place in 
history and the achievements of the past, but it is of at least equal 
importance that the document is accessible and intelligible and can be 
understood even by readers not familiar with constitutional law. 
 As a result, constitutional 
scholarship regularly does not focus much on the relationship between 
slavery and the Constitution. Similarly, the inattentive reader may 
simply skip these passages without seeing its implications for slavery. 
The Reconstruction Amendments, of course, employ a much clearer 
language. However, applying Madison’s approach, a clearer reference 
to the abolishment of slavery could have been placed at a more pivotal 
place in the preamble. 
 
 C.  The Character of the Bill of Rights  
 
Constitutional provisions for the protection of individual rights 
were already proposed during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, 
but no comprehensive bill of rights was agreed upon.164 Opponents 
argued that the constitutional protection of individual rights was not 
necessary because the federal government did not have the power to 
infringe rights in the first place, and substantive differences between 
the state constitutions prevented consensus with regard to the 
formulation of rights, for example the right to trial by jury in civil 
cases.165 The original Constitution encompasses only some specific 
individual rights, such as the right to trial by jury in criminal cases,166
 
 163. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. (amended 1865). 
 
 164. Kaminski, supra note 11, at 889–90. 
 165. ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 11–18. 
 166. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.167 Following the 
Philadelphia Convention, the lack of a constitutional catalogue of 
rights proved to be a potential obstacle to the ratification process.168 
As a reaction, Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 84 
that many state constitutions also did not contain catalogues of 
individual rights, and that the Constitution already encompassed 
numerous rights protections.169 Rights would only be necessary as 
safeguards of subjects towards their king. Because the Constitution 
established a government of the people by the people, such a 
safeguard was not necessary.170 The Founders were also skeptical as 
to the effectiveness of individual rights protections because the 
declarations of rights encompassed by some state constitutions had not 
prevented the state legislatures from violating private rights.171 
Finally, adding individual rights might not only be superfluous but 
also dangerous because it might be understood as stipulating 
exceptions to powers which are not granted to the national 
government.172
Regardless of Hamilton’s remarks, many state conventions ratified 
the Constitution only with the understanding that a bill of rights would 
soon be established.
 
173 Many state conventions even submitted their 
own proposals. Madison himself had promised his constituency in 
Virginia to introduce a proposal.174 Nevertheless, the debate about the 
desirability of a bill of rights continued in the First Congress.175
Sherman and his supporters succeeded in having the amendments 
annexed to the Constitution, but their project to undermine the 
significance of the Bill of Rights failed. Although it was not until the 
twentieth century that the full potential of the Bill of Rights started to 
 
Against this background, Sherman’s proposal to add the amendments 
to the original Constitution in the way of an annex has to be seen as 
an attempt of the Bill of Rights’ opponents to downplay the 
importance of the amendments. The amendments were not supposed to 
share the high authority of the original Constitution and should be 
clearly distinguishable from the latter in order to make their alleged 
superfluity visible. 
 
 167. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 168. See Kaminski, supra note 11, at 893–912. 
 169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 81, at 575–78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 170. Id. at 578–79. 
 171. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 106. 
 172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 81, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 173. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 12 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 174. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 36. 
 175. See Kaminski, supra note 11, at 913–20. 
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unfold, particularly in its application against the states through 
incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment,176
How has the decision in favor of the supplementary mode of 
constitutional amendment influenced the development and perception 
of the Bill of Rights? If Madison had prevailed, most parts of today’s 
Bill of Rights would have been inserted in Article I, Section 9 as 
limits on Congress and in Article III as safeguards in judicial 
proceedings.
 there is no doubt that 
the amendments enjoy the same normative status as the original 
Constitution. Moreover, their alleged superfluity in comparison with 
the original Constitution has yet to be realized. 
177 The substance of the first ten amendments would have 
been kept but they would not have come along in the form of a neat 
Decalogue. The symbolic dimension that is encompassed by the Bill of 
Rights in their collectivity would be diminished. The people could not 
as easily identify with single rights provisions spread across the seven 
articles of the Constitution as they can with reference to the Bill of 
Rights, as a more or less comprehensive collection of fundamental 
rights guarantees.178
Having constitutional rights bundled together in the 
“interconnected package”
 
179 of ten amendments rather than spread 
throughout the Constitution should also have eased the development of 
a coherent general doctrine of fundamental rights. Modern 
constitutions usually consist of two components: a catalogue of 
fundamental rights and structural provisions establishing government 
and distributing competences.180
 
 176. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 215–30 (1998). 
 While both components are 
interrelated, the distinction between individual rights and structural 
provisions is of some significance. The constitutional law of modern 
states usually encompasses general rules—whether explicit in the 
Constitution or developed in constitutional doctrine—that apply to all 
individual rights. These general rules regulate, for example, who is 
the bearer of the rights, who is bound by those rights, what constitutes 
 177. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834) reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 178. See Goldwin, supra note 128, at 62 (“If the House of Representatives had gone along 
with Madison’s proposal to insert the new articles in the body of the Constitution, it would have 
been difficult to think of them collectively as a body to be called the Bill of Rights, or any other 
collective name.”); see also Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Adoption of the 
Bill of Rights, reprinted in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 46, 53 (Patrick T. Conley & 
John P. Kaminski eds., 1992); Marshall, supra note 8, at 113; AMAR, supra note 176, at 291–
92. 
 179. Amar, supra note 154, at 694. 
 180. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial Power, reprinted in 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 217, 219 (Daniele Caramania ed., 2008). 
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an infringement, and whether and how such an infringement can be 
justified. 
In American constitutional law, such general terms that would 
apply to all fundamental rights similarly have only partially developed. 
Fundamental rights doctrine has evolved independently for each right. 
For instance, First Amendment doctrine bears only little resemblance 
to the doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, or of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, there are some general 
rules that apply in a similar way to all fundamental rights guarantees. 
The state action doctrine generally applies to all fundamental rights, 
and within the discussion of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, 
constitutional rights are put into relation to each other. The bundling 
of the rights made these developments easier, thus, laying open the 
shared nature of the rights embodied in the Bill of Rights. 
This coherence of individual rights doctrine is best exhibited in the 
discussion of whether the Bill of Rights applies to the states. In 1833, 
when the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore that 
the rights embodied in the amendments apply only to the federal 
government and not to the states, Chief Justice Marshall did not 
regard the different wording of the amendments as significant.181 The 
First Amendment explicitly applies only to Congress while the Fifth 
Amendment, which was discussed in Barron, does not encompass any 
such restriction. Nevertheless, Marshall did not have difficulties 
applying the same standards to all parts of the Bill of Rights alike, 
limiting their scope of application to actions taken by the federal 
government.182 Subsequently, the Supreme Court explicitly and 
generally held that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect against 
the federal government and not against the states.183
Similarly, when the discussion started of whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated fundamental rights guarantees, it was 
primarily focused on the Bill of Rights as a whole. Congressmen John 
Bingham and Jacob Howard both expressed the opinion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all the guarantees encompassed 
by the Bill of Rights,
 
184 and so did Justice Hugo Black.185
 
 181. Barron v. Mayor of Balt. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (“These amendments 
contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court 
cannot so apply them.”). 
 
 182. See id. 
 183. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947) overruled by McDonald v. Chicago, 
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 184. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 387–88 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2765–66 (1866)). 
 185. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 
162–63 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court did not incorporate the Bill of 
Rights as a whole; rather, it incorporated specific rights encompassed 
by the first eight amendments.186 This selective approach is 
understandable against the background of the case or controversy 
clause.187 The broader debate, however, focused on the question of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the whole Bill of 
Rights or only some parts of it.188 The bundling of fundamental rights 
in the first eight amendments intuitively raises the question why only 
some and not all parts of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated. It 
is furthermore remarkable that the incorporation discussion 
concentrated solely on the Bill of Rights and did not encompass other 
individual rights guarantees that are spread throughout the seven 
articles of the original Constitution.189
It seems possible, and indeed very likely, that the bundling of 
rights in the Bill of Rights contributed to forming the debate and 
directing the focus on the first eight amendments. Had these 
amendments been interwoven with the original Constitution in the way 
Madison envisioned, the debate could have gone a different way. The 
provisions encompassed now by the Bill of Rights would not as easily 
be regarded as building a normative unity. It would not be as 
intuitively logical to apply the same standards generally to all of the 
rights. It would not have been as easy and convincing for proponents 
of total incorporation to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated all the guarantees that were adopted at the First 
Congress. In fact, it would have been more difficult to argue in favor 
of incorporation at all, had the Fourteenth Amendment been 
interwoven in the original Constitution.
 
190
While the unification of the first ten amendments in the Bill of 
 
 
 186. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable search and seizure); Klopfer 
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy 
trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against double jeopardy). For a more comprehensive list, see CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 173, at 503–504. 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 188. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173, at 500–03. 
 189. In Torcaso v. Watkins the Supreme Court held that Maryland’s requirement of a 
declaration of a belief in God for taking public office violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Only in a footnote did Justice Black address the question of whether Article VI, § 
3 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,” was violated. However, 
since the Court reversed the judgment on other grounds he found it unnecessary to examine 
whether this provision also applied to the states. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 n.1 
(1961). 
 190. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 112–13. 
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Rights might therefore have facilitated at least a certain degree of 
coherence among the enumerated rights, it might at the same time 
have contributed to a distortion of the relationship between the original 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. As has already been pointed out, 
the focus on the Bill of Rights has led to a certain neglect of the 
individual rights enshrined in the original Constitution.191 The 
supplementary model of constitutional amendment might also have 
contributed to an excessively dichotomic understanding of the original 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. While the former is deemed to be 
concerned mainly with structural issues of the establishment and 
organization of government, the latter is regarded as endowing 
individuals with rights against encroachment by the majority.192 This 
view is not incorrect but it is too simplistic. It tends to overlook that 
the Bill of Rights is deeply intertwined with structural questions of 
government and does not only employ minority rights but also, more 
generally, rights that are supposed to guard society against a 
government that does not act in the general interest.193
 
 Sherman’s 
approach to constitutional amendment allowed for the development of 
an understanding of the Bill of Rights as an inclusive normative 
system—a constitution besides the Constitution. While this might have 
strengthened the internal coherence of the application and 
interpretation of the specific rights, it also contributed to a one-sided 
and biased approach to the Bill of Rights as being concerned only 
with—allegedly countermajoritarian—individual rights guarantees. 
 D.  Constitutional Interpretation  
 
Until now this article has tried to show what impact the decision 
of the First Congress to attach amendments to the original Constitution 
supposedly had on subsequent constitutional developments in a broad, 
conceptual perspective. Turning to more doctrinal issues, the question 
arises whether the model of amendment had and has an impact on 
constitutional interpretation. In other words: would the prevailing 
interpretation of the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution have 
been different had they not been appended but integrated into the text 
of the original Constitution? 
 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173, at 1-5. 
 193. Amar, supra note 124, at 1131. 
87] CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS 121 
1.  The relevance of location  
 
The perennial debate about the right or appropriate way to 
interpret the Constitution—most prominently carried out between 
“originalists” and “living constitutionalists”—is well-known. 
Notwithstanding this debate and its jurisprudential underpinnings194, 
constitutional practice exhibits the constant usage of certain types of 
argumentation. Philip Bobbitt has identified the prevailing interpretive 
modalities as historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and 
ethical.195 At the first view, it does not seem to make a difference 
whether the amendments are adhered to or integrated in the original 
Constitution: the historical background will be the same, the text will 
be identical—or at least it can be identical—doctrinal, prudential, and 
ethical considerations will not be different, and even the structure of 
the Constitution will hardly be affected. However, a constitutional 
provision cannot only be read in clause-bound isolation, as in classical 
textual analysis, and also not only from the broad perspective of 
constitutional structure. Situated somewhat in-between the micro and 
the macro perspective applied by those two interpretive modalities are 
systematic modes of interpretation that focus on the text of a certain 
clause or phrase, but derive constitutional meaning from an analysis of 
its relationship with other clauses of the Constitution; this mode of 
interpretation has been called “locational textualism,” or 
“architextur[alism]”196 or “architectural.”197
The use of this interpretive method is best displayed in the two 
landmark decisions of Marbury v. Madison
 
198 and McCulloch v. 
Maryland.199 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall ruled 
that, although the Court could not issue a mandamus due to 
jurisdictional reasons, Marbury had a right to his commission as 
justice of the peace.200 Marshall argued that Marbury was already 
appointed, and that the delivery of the commission was not a 
constitutive part of the appointment process.201
 
 194. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24–28, on 
file with the author). 
 In order to arrive at 
this conclusion, Marshall referred to the location of the appointing 
 195. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3–119 (1982). For a more recent 
comprehensive study, see LACKHAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 196. Amar, supra note 154, at 672, 696. 
 197. BLOOM, JR., supra note 195, at 44. 
 198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 199. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 200. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 162. 
 201. Id. at 159–162. 
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power and the power to grant commissions, reasoning that “[t]he acts 
of appointing to office, and commissioning the person appointed, can 
scarcely be considered as one and the same; since the power to 
perform them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the 
constitution.”202
In McCulloch, Marshall was faced with the question of whether 
Congress had the power to establish a national bank.
 
203 Marshall 
concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause204 empowered 
Congress and did not limit its competences.205 He derived this reading 
from the location of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is based 
in Section 8 of Article I and deals with the powers of Congress rather 
than the limitations of Congress laid down in Section 9.206
In light of this mode of argumentation—which, of course, is not 
alone decisive and can be trumped by other argumentative 
modalities
 
207
 
—the decision to adhere the amendments and to not 
integrate them into the original text can have an influence on 
constitutional interpretation. In the following, I will demonstrate this 
influence with the help of a few examples. 
2.  Clarifying the scope of application of the Bill of Rights  
 
If Madison had prevailed, today’s First Amendment would have 
been integrated in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution among 
the other limitations of Congress’s powers.208 This would have made 
the contemporary and rather extensive interpretation of the First 
Amendment more difficult. Although the First Amendment textually 
applies only to Congress209—and through incorporation via the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the state legislatures—the Supreme Court 
has not applied the First Amendment solely to the legislative branch. 
The Court has declared unconstitutional not only federal and state 
laws, but also the posting of the Ten Commandments to a courthouse 
in two Kentucky counties,210
 
 202. Id. at 156. 
 state university policies excluding 
religious student groups from the use of university facilities that were 
 203. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 401. 
 204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18. 
 205. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 418–419. 
 206. Id. at 419. 
 207. See Amar, supra note 154, at 698; BLOOM, JR., supra note 195, at 44–45. 
 208. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12; Hartnett, supra note 8, at 289. 
 209. “Congress shall make no law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 210. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
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generally available for activities of student groups,211 and a state 
agency’s refusal to allow the Ku Klux Klan to build a large Latin 
cross in a park next to the state capitol.212
Similar observations apply to other parts of the Bill of Rights. The 
Fourth Amendment, for example, undoubtedly provides a 
constitutional protection directly against unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the police.
 This extensive interpretation 
of the First Amendment conflicts with the text of the provision. In 
order to apply the guarantees enshrined in the First Amendment not 
only to the legislature but also to other branches of government, and 
not only to laws but also to simple acts and administrative decisions, 
the Court had to overcome the textual command. Had Madison 
prevailed and had the provision we know today as the First 
Amendment been integrated in Article I, Section 9, the argumentative 
burden for the Court would have been even heavier. The Court would 
not only have to ignore the explicit textual content but also the 
location of the provision that would have clearly indicated that 
religious and communicative freedoms were deemed to apply against 
legislative acts. And the Supreme Court’s decisions in Marbury and 
McCulloch show that the Court takes this locational argument 
seriously. This is not to say that the Court would not have extended 
the scope of the First Amendment in a similar way, as it actually did, 
had the text of the amendment been integrated in Article I, Section 9. 
However, the Court would have faced an additional argument against 
such a broad reading, and critics of the Court would have had an 
additional point of attack against the Court’s jurisprudence. 
213 Unlike the First Amendment, it does not 
encompass a textual limitation to actions by Congress. However, had 
the text of the Fourth Amendment been integrated into Article I, 
Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution as Madison proposed,214
From the perspective of eighteenth century constitutionalism, the 
focus on Congress is understandable. It seems that the Founders’ main 
concern in limiting the powers of the national government and thereby 
preventing abuse of power was directed at Congress. Hamilton 
 the 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment as a protection directed 
against police action would be at least more complicated. 
Constitutional interpretation would be faced with the problem of 
applying a provision in Article I, Section 9 that deals with limits on 
the powers of Congress to executive action. 
 
 211. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 212. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 213. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 214. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
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characterized the judiciary as the least dangerous branch,215 and in the 
Founding vision the office of the Presidency was expected to be 
carried out with “Republican virtue.”216 Moreover, while the idea of 
the separation of powers was at the core of the Founders’ 
constitutional conception, it appears they regarded most governmental 
activities to be dependent on Congress. For example, Congress was 
supposed to make the laws that the executive carried out and the 
courts interpreted and applied. From that perspective, constitutional 
restraints on Congress could be understood as constitutional restraints 
on all branches of government in general.217
In contemporary constitutional thought, by contrast, all three 
branches of government are directly subject to the constitutional 
limitations of fundamental rights guarantees. The peacetime quartering 
of soldiers without the consent of the house owner violates the Third 
Amendment
 
218
 
 whether it is ordered by a congressional statute, 
directly by the President, or based upon a court decision. Had the first 
amendments been integrated in Article I, Section 9 and Article III, 
Section 2, respectively, the prohibition of non-consensual peacetime 
quartering could, of course, also have been extended to all three 
branches of government. But this extensive reading would have had to 
overcome the argumentative obstacle of applying fundamental rights 
guarantees to all branches of government although their location in the 
text of the Constitution would indicate that their scope of application 
should be limited to one. 
3.  Avoiding ambiguities between the amendments and the original 
Constitution  
 
When Madison wrote to White in August 1789 and reported that 
Sherman had prevailed in changing the form of the amendments, he 
voiced the concern that:  
 
[I]t is already apparent I think that some ambiguities will be 
produced by this change, as the question will often arise and 
sometimes be not easily solved, how far the original text is or is not 
necessarily superseded, by the supplemental act.219
 
 215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 
 216. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 67–68. 
 217. ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 49. 
 218. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 219. Letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 287–88. 
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This problem foreseen by Madison arose, for example, with regard to 
the question of whether and how far the Fifth and the Sixth 
Amendments affect the content of Article III of the Constitution. In 
Patton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the guarantee of 
jury trial in criminal cases in Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the 
Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment constitutes primarily a right 
of the defendant and can therefore be waived.220 The Court drew upon 
the history of Article III and the framers’ intent, but also referred to 
the text of the Sixth Amendment that clearly depicts jury trial as a 
right of the accused.221 However, if regarded in isolation, the jury 
clause in Article III is more convincingly understood as putting an 
objective obligation on the government.222 Due to the coexistence of 
the Amendment and Article III, the Court could refer to the Sixth 
Amendment as an additional factor in favor of its reading of Article 
III. Regardless of whether one agrees with the holding of the Court in 
Patton, the opinion shows how the supplementary form of the 
amendments can lead to more ambiguity and thereby increase the 
argumentative options for constitutional interpretation. Had the Court 
wanted to reach the opposite result, it could have put more emphasis 
on the text of Article III and argued that the First Congress did not 
intend to alter the meaning of Article III through the Sixth 
Amendment. Under the Madisonian model, this ambiguity would cease 
to exist: the Sixth Amendment would have been split up, with the 
more detailed regulation about the criminal trial jury in Article III, 
and with other rights of the accused in criminal proceedings inserted 
in Article I, Section 9.223 Madison’s approach would have forced the 
framers to decide on less ambiguous language. There would have been 
no potentially waiveable “right” to trial by jury in the text of the 
Constitution but only the more objectively formulated obligation that 
the trial of all crimes “shall be by an impartial jury.”224
 
 
 
 220. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297–98 (1930). 
 221. Id. at 298; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 222. Amar, supra note 124, at 1196–97. 
 223. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 260–61; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., 
ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 224. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
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4.  Clarifying the scope of enforcement powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments  
 
The Reconstruction Amendments do not only extend the concept 
of citizenship and encompass prohibitions on the federal government 
and the state with regard to race discrimination. They also empower 
Congress to enforce the provisions of the three Amendments through 
appropriate legislation.225 However, in 1883 the Supreme Court held 
in the Civil Rights Cases that Congress had no authority to enact laws 
against private discrimination under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.226 While the Court has overruled this restrictive approach 
with regard to the enforcement power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment,227 it reaffirmed its position with regard to the Fourteenth 
Amendment as recently as in the 2000 decision of United States v. 
Morrison.228
 
 The reasoning underlying the Civil Rights Cases and 
Morrison reflects a holistic view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just 
like Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is only addressed to state 
action, Section 5 authorizes Congress only to regulate discrimination 
by the states and not private behavior. This view is expressed by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Morrison: 
Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that 
the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state 
action. “[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our 
constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to 
be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against 
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”229
 
 
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole does not apply to 
private action.230 The Court employs a similarly holistic approach with 
regard to the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While 
the Court held in Katzenbach v. Morgan that the Fourteenth 
Amendment vested broad powers in Congress comparable to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,231
 
 225. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, amend. XIV, § 5, amend. XV, § 2. 
 it retreated from this approach in 
 226. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 227. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160 (1976); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 228. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 229. Id. at 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). 
 230. For a different reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, see AMAR, supra note 2, at 
382–83. 
 231. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). 
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City of Boerne v. Flores, and emphasized that Section 5 authorized 
Congress only to enact “remedial” legislation.232 It explicitly rejected 
the view that Section 5 allowed Congress to expand the scope of the 
rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.233 The 
scope of Congress’s powers under Section 5 therefore only extends as 
far as the prohibition under Section 1 reaches. The Supreme Court has 
confirmed this approach in subsequent decisions.234
The approach of the Supreme Court under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been subject to harsh criticism, and 
compelling arguments can be relied on in favor of a more extensive 
approach.
 
235
This locational argument would fall away under Madison’s 
approach to the amendment technique. Although we can only assume 
how the Reconstruction Congress would have integrated the substance 
of the Amendments into the text of the Constitution, it presumably 
would have split up the Amendments, placed the prohibitory elements 
at different places in the Constitution, and integrated the enforcement 
powers into Article I, Section 8. Edward Hartnett has suggested that 
the substance of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment would 
probably have been added to the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
clarifying that Congress had the authority to “enforce the limitations 
and obligations imposed by this Constitution,” thereby also 
encompassing the enforcement power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
 The location of Section 5, however, supports the Court’s 
restrictive reading. The placement of Section 5 next to Section 1 
within the same Amendment suggests a common understanding of the 
scope of the two provisions, with Congress’s power under Section 5 
reaching only as far as the prohibition under Section 1. The same 
holds true for the Court’s holding that Section 5 does not encompass 
the regulation of private conduct. If private conduct is not prohibited 
under Section 1, it seems intelligible and coherent that Congress 
cannot regulate it under Section 5. 
236
 
 232. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 Regardless of whether Congress would 
have chosen exactly this approach, the clearer separation of limits on 
Congress and government in general on the one side, and powers of 
Congress on the other, would have allowed for a broader 
understanding of Congressional powers after Reconstruction. It would 
 233. Id. at 527–28. 
 234. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
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People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 236. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 269, 275–76. 
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have been easier to maintain and elaborate the broad approach taken 
by the Court in Katzenbach. The enforcement powers would be read 
rather in their context with other broad powers of Congress under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause, and not so 
much within their relationship with the prohibitory elements of today’s 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
 E.  Constitutional Moments and Intergenerational Synthesis  
 
The foregoing examples have shown how individual amendments 
have to be brought into accordance with individual provisions of the 
original Constitution. This touches upon a more general phenomenon 
of constitutional development. Significant constitutional developments 
can raise the question of whether they not only influence single 
provisions of the original Constitution, but demand a more 
fundamental, conceptual change in the understanding and interpretation 
of the Constitution. This question has most prominently been attacked 
by Bruce Ackerman.237 According to Ackerman, the history of the 
American Republic is characterized by distinctive constitutional 
moments of higher lawmaking.238 He identifies the Founding, 
Reconstruction, and the New Deal as the “three great turning points of 
constitutional history.”239 These three moments of higher lawmaking 
are characterized by significant normative transformations brought 
along by the people who in a five-step process—consisting of 
signaling, proposal, deliberation, ratification, and consolidation—
engage in higher lawmaking.240 These normative transformations can 
come along as formal amendments, such as the Reconstruction 
Amendments,241 or they can take shape in form of important judicial 
decisions (“landmark cases”) and statutes (“superstatutes”).242 This 
division of constitutional history into constitutional moments entails 
the necessity of intergenerational synthesis.243
 
 237. See ACKERMAN, supra note 
 According to 
Ackerman, transformative amendments—regardless of whether they 
5; ACKERMAN, supra note 3. For a summary of 
Ackerman’s theory, see Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 116–22 (1994). 
 238. ACKERMAN, supra note 5. 
 239. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 58. 
 240. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 266–94. 
 241. Note, however, that according to Ackerman the Reconstruction Amendments did not 
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 243. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 86–99, 131–62. 
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come along in the formal way of Article V amendments or not—have 
to be integrated into the original Constitution not only with regard to 
the specific provisions they might affect, but also on a higher level of 
generality; this task of synthesizing the different constitutional regimes 
is carried out by the judiciary in particular.244 It is for the courts to 
reconcile the diverse paradigms dominating the three constitutional 
moments: the Founding’s concern with individual rights and limited 
national government, the implications of Reconstruction for equal 
protection of the races and arguably other minorities and social 
groups, and the New Deal’s affirmation and legitimization of activist 
government and of regulatory interference in economic and social 
life.245
Ackerman thereby invites us to understand constitutional 
development not as a steady flow of events, but rather as a process of 
normal politics that is at times disrupted by constitutional revolutions 
of a transformative nature in which the people engage in higher 
lawmaking.
 
246 It has been pointed out that the technique of adhering 
amendments to the Constitution highlights and facilitates the issue of 
intergenerational synthesis.247 And indeed, as Ackerman himself 
stipulates, had the Reconstruction Republicans not limited themselves 
to the three amendments, but proposed a completely new Constitution, 
the issue of synthesis would not have arisen.248
The supplementary form of the amendments certainly makes it 
easier to see the synthesis problem. However, substantively the same 
problem would arise had the amendments been integrated into the text. 
Furthermore, not all amendments take part in the intergenerational 
synthesis of Ackerman’s theory. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, for 
example, is characterized as a mere “superstatute” and not as a 
transformative amendment.
 
249 It changes only the voting age and not 
any deeper principles underlying the Constitution.250 On the other 
hand, Ackerman does not only include formal amendments in the 
process of synthesis, but also—as in the New Deal—constitutional 
principles that are expressed in other ways, such as landmark 
decisions or superstatutes.251
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that has to be synthesized with the traditional principles of the 
preceding constitutional regimes has to be identified, regardless of 
whether it comes along in the form of an amendment or an unwritten 
transformation. 
 
 IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The supplementary form of the amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution is a peculiarity that is hardly recognized as such by 
scholars and students. An inquiry into the background of the First 
Congress’s choice in favor of this mode of amendment reveals the 
somewhat arbitrary and misguided character of the decision. 
Constitutional scholars seldom pay attention to this historical fact 
although it arguably had some impact on subsequent constitutional 
developments. It influenced the practice of constitutional amendments 
as well as our understanding of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
It also has some subtle but relevant implications for the interpretation 
of the amendments and their relationship with the original 
Constitution. 
Constitutional scholars who deal with the amendment form 
regularly also evaluate the First Congress’s decision in favor of 
Sherman’s approach. While some have argued that Madison’s proposal 
would have resulted in a better Bill of Rights and avoided some 
interpretive ambiguities,252 others highlight the merits of Sherman’s 
approach.253
 
 Regardless of these different assessments, the somewhat 
idiosyncratic style of constitutional amendment is part and parcel of 
American constitutionalism. The purpose of this article is to contribute 
to the understanding of this design choice and of its implications for 
past and future constitutional developments. 
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